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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HON ALD BRADSHA'iV, et al,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

1·

vs.

BEAVER CITY, a Municipal
1·
Corporation, et al.,
Defcndants and Respondents . .

Case No.
12524

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEl\IENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is a taxpayer's suit brought by residents of
Heaver City, Utah, to enjoin the proposed annexation
of certain property by Beaver City, on the grounds that
the proposed annexation is arbitrary, unreasonable and
<.:apricious, constitutes an abuse of municipal authority,
and is not in compliance with Section 10-3-1, Utah Code
;\nnotated (H)53).
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DISPOSITION IX LOWER COURT
Upon the lVIotions of the various defendants for
Summary Judgment, the trial Court found that there
was no genuine issue as to any material facts and that
the defendants were entitled to Judgment as a matter
of law, and accordingly, entered Summary Judgment
against the plaintiffs (R. 50-51).
RELIEF SOUGllT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs seek to have the Summary Judgment
of the trial Court reversed and vacated and to have the
case remanded for a trial on the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs, all residents, property owners and
taxpayers of Beaver City, Beaver County, State of
Utah, brought this action, subsequent to the commencement of annexation proceedings but prior to actual
annexation under Section 10-3-1 Utah Code Annotated,
against the defendants, in behalf of themselves and as
representatives of other taxpayers in Beaver City who
were similarly situated.
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges inter alia:
1. That Beaver City proposed to annex into the

corporate limits of the City, certain properties owned
by defendants Farkas, Interstate Land, Inc., Timbel
and Bell, doing business as Interstate Development

2

('onipauy, a part11ership (hereinafter referred to as the

md ividual and corporate defendants")

( R. 4-8) ;

:2. Thal the proposed annexation was arbitrary, un-

reasonable and capricious under all of the facts of the
case;
3. That the proposed annexation fails to comply
with the requirements of Section 10-3-1, Utah Code
,\1111otated ( 19.53);
!·. That to permit the annexation to go forward

as proposed would constitute an unlawful and unconstitutional delegation by the Beaver City Council of
municipal authority to the individual and corporate
<lefcndants by conditioning the annexation upon the completion by those defendants of water lines and streets in
such a way as to vest in them the power and right to
determine when and if ever the property might be annexed ( R. 8) ;
5. And that the proposed annexation was contrary

to the previously announced statement of public policy
by the Ueaver City Council, upon which statement of
policy the plaintiff taxpayers had relied to their detriment. (R. 9-10).
The prayer of plaintiffs' Complaint then urges the
trial Court to adjudicate and declare that the proposed
annexation, under the facts of the case, constitutes an
unlawful and unconstitutional delegation of municipal
corporate authority, and that it is, under the circumarbitrary, capricious and clearly unreasonable,
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and not in the public interests of Beaver City . .Further,
the plaintiffs pray that the Court enjoin and restrain
Beaver City and its Council
from unreasonably and arbitrarily exercising the power of annexation
and that the individual and corporate defendants be enjoined from undertaking any action in reliance on the
proposed annexation. (R. 10-ll).
The defendants answered and denied the material
allegations of plaintiffs' Complaint. (R. 13-22).
Thereupon, Beaver City and its Council members,
and the individual and corporate defendants tiled their
respective Motions for Summary Judgment (R. 2327) . Those Motions were predicated and based upon
accompanying Affidavits.
The individual and corporate defendants relied
solely upon the Affidavit of one Thomas 1-Iall, a project
manager for the American Oil Company, in which it
was set forth, by way of summary, that American Oil
Company would not develop certain land on which it had
an option from one of the individual defendants unless
the land was commercially zoned, that the land could
not be so zoned unless within the corporate boundaries
of Beaver City, and that the only good service station
land available was that land proposed to he annexed.
(R. 25-26).

Defendant Beaver City, and its Council members.
relied upon the Affidavit of three of the Council members, C. Elmer Paiee, Delbert T. Lund and 'Varren

4

Thompson, in whieh it was stated, by way of summary:
1. That Beaver City was requested by Interstate

De,·elopment Company to annex the subject land.

2. That all of the property proposed to be annexed

was owned by Interstate Development Company.

a.

That at"no time did they state that the public
policy was satisfied by the existing commercial property then within the corporate City limits.
4. That at no time did they declare that it was the

public policy of Beaver City to fully utilize the then
existing commercially zoned property within Beaver
City before any further commercial annexation would
occur.
5. That at no time did they make any public pro-

nouncement against annexation.
6. That the conditions which they imposed upon the

individual and corporate defendants for annexation
were not contrary to any pronouncement, resolution or
actions of the Beaver City Council. ( R. 29-31).
thereupon filed a Counter-Affidavit,
contravening the material statements set forth in the
Heaver City affidavit and putting the purported facts
contained therein in issue. ( R. 32-33) .
Neither of the defendants' Affidavits sets forth
any issues relating to the compliance by Beaver City
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with the requirements of the annexation provisions of
the State statute under Section 10-2-1, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953), confronts any issues relating to the
arbitrariness, capriciousness or unreasonableness, under
the circumstances, of the proposed annexation, or is
directed to any issues relating to whether the proposed
annexation represented an unlawful and unconstitutional delegation of municipal authority. (R. 25-26,
29-31, 32-33).

After the submission of briefs by all parties, and
upon receipt of oral argument, the trial Court rendered
Summary Judgment against the plaintiff's and in favor
of the defendants on the ground that there was no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that defendants
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (R. 5051).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT CAN BE GRANTED
ONLY WHEN THERE IS NO GENUINE
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACTS.
The law relating to the granting of summary judgments has, on numerous occasions, been clearly set forth
and amplified by this Court. As this Court has stated
and reiterated, the explicit purpose of Rule 56, Utah
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Hules of Civil Proee<lure, is to eliminate protracted an<l
i:xpcnsive litigation where there is nu genuine issue uf
111uterial fact. Continental Bank &
Company v.
('zwninglw1n, 10 Utah 2d 32U, 353 P.2d 168 (1960);
,lclna Loan Compan.lJ v. Fidelity Deposit Company,
!I Utah 412, 346 P.2d 1078 (1U5U). Nevertheless, since
summary judgment is a severe and drastic measure,
lhc courts have been hesitant and reluctant to deprive
]itigants of an opportunity to fully present their contentions and proof upon the merits at trial and therefore, doubts have been resolved in favor of allowing
a full trial of the cause. fVelclmian v. Wood, 9 Utah
2d 25, 337 P.2d 410 ( 1U5U) ; Richards v. Anderson,
fl Utah 2d 17, 337 P .2d 5U ( 1U59) . '\There there is an,lJ
genuine issue as to any material fact a motion for summary judgment should be denied. Young v. Ji'elornia,
121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862 (1962); Hatch v. Sugar
llousc Pinance Co., 20 Utah 2d, 156, 434 P.2d 788
( 1967); Larsen v. Christensen, 21 Utah 2d :nu, 443
P.2d 402 (1968).
In the present case, there were no facts before the
trial Court which were uncontested except for certain
irrelevant and immaterial statements eontained in the
Thomas llall Affidavit which do not go to the fun<lameutal issues of this case. (It. 25-26). Indeed there
·were no material facts which were not in issue. The
issues of the abuse of power by the Heaver City Council,
its failure to comply with the statutory requirements
(lf Section 10-3-1,
Code Annotated, 1U5i3, and the
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impermissible delegation of legislative authority by
City Council were all in total diYputc between the parties. Moreover, the Affidavit of the certain Beaver
City Council members, itself, raises significant questions
as to the compliance with the annexation statute.
example, there is no indication that the Council was
properly petitioned as required by Section 10-3-1, that
the required plat or map was filed with the office of
the town clerk, or that the territory sought to be annexed was contiguous with the Beaver City limits.
And as to the latter-most item, the Affidavit almost
consciously avoids a definitive statement that the territory to be annexed was contiguous with the City
limits when it uses the terminology "immediately
north" of Beaver City. (R. 29). "Immediately north"
is an inexact and relative descriptive term which might
include everything from contiguity with Beaver Corporate City limits to an area as far north as Cove Fort,
or beyond for that matter.
Thus, in order to render the Summary Judgment
herein, the lower Court had to have determined what it
considered the facts to be and arrived at its judgment
based on that determination. Such action by a trial
court on a motion for summary judgment has been
clearly proscribed by this Court in Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., 477 P.2d 150 (1970). This Court stated:
"Summary Judgment is never used to determine what the facts are, but only to ascertain
whether there are any material issues of fact in
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<lispute. If there Le any such disputed issues of
fact, they cannot Le resolved by Summary J udgmeut even when the parties properly bring the
motion before the eourt." (Emphasis the court's).

POINT II.
THE PLAINTIFFS lIEllEIN \VERE PROPEUL Y BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
\Vhen a municipal corporation acts arbitrarily,
capriciously or um·easonably in abuse of its power, or
without authorization to so act at all, such acts are
subject to review by the courts. 1'ygescn v. Magna
1Vater Co., llU Utah 274, 226 P.2d 127 (19.50). Such
acts may be properly attacked by citizens of the municipality by quo warranto proceedings when the annexation has been completed, Jensen v. Bountiful City, 20
Utah 2d, 15U, 435 P.2d 284 ( 1967), or, when annexation proceedings are still pending and the remedy of
quo warranto has not yet matured, by mandamus or
injunction. A11ierican Distilling Co. v. City Council of
Sausalito, 34 Cal. 2d 660, 213 P.2d 704, 18 ALR 2d
1247 ( 1950); Colquhoun v. Tucson, 55 Ariz. 451, 103
P.2d 269 (1940); Gorman v. Phoenix, 70 Ariz. 59,
:!16 P.2d 400 (1950). Pueblo v. Stanton, 4.5 Colo. 523,
10:.? Pac. 512 (1909).
l n a case very much similar to the present case, and
dealing with a statutory annexation provision almost
idcntieal to Section 10-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, the
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Arizona Supreme Court in Gunnan 'l'. Phoeni.t', supra.,
held that injunctive relief was the proper remedy for
citizens of Phoenix who opposed a pending annexation.
There, the plaintiff taxpayers sought to enjoin the
annexation on the ground that the requirements of the
annexation statute had not been met, and therefore,
that the City was acting without express statutory
authority and jurisdiction. The trial Court dismisse<l
plaintiff's Complaint on the ground that it failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
Supreme Court of Arizona, reversing, held that the
plaintiffs were proper parties and that injunction, where
the annexation proceedings were still pending and had
not been completed, was the proper remedy. The Court
said at 403, 216 P.2d:

" * * * an interested taxpayer may bring an
action to prevent the completion of an attempt to
change boundaries of a municipal corporation
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In the
present case the contention was that the defendants should be enjoined from proceeding further
because under the admitted facts it had no jurisdiction to annex the area involved.
"A citizen may not attack an annexation ordinance after the same is completed, but may enjoin
the city during the process of an annexation
where its alleged that the city lacks jurisdiction
of the property."
In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged the jurisdictional facts that the annexation proceedings had
not been commenced in a<'cordancc with Section 10-3-1,
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C tah Code Annotated. There were no affidavits, contrcffeniug that allegation, which were submitted in
of defendants' lVIotions for Summary J udgment, and as noted herein above, the Affidavit submitted by the certain members of the Heaver City Couneil, on its face, tends to show noncompliance with the
annexation statute.
A municipal corporation has no power to alter its
boundary except as provided for by a legislative enactment or constitutional provision, and while such power,
in this State, may be validly delegated to the municipal
rnrporation by the Legislature, the exercise of that
power must be in strict accordance with the statute
conferring it. Young v. Salt Lake City) 24 Utah 321,
li7 Pac. 1066 ( 1902). It is for the trial Court, based
upon the facts of the case, to determine statutory compliance and whether the power delegated has been exercised in strict compliance with the statutory requirements. Plntus Mining Co. v. Orme) 76 Utah 286, 289
Pac. 132 (1930); Tygesen v. Magrw. Water Co.J supra.
There were no undisputed facts before the trial Court
upon which it could make such a determination on motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs are entitled to a trial on the merits as to the disputed issues
of statutory compliance.

POINT III.
:\ )!CNICIP AL CORPORATION IS SUBJECT
TO IN.Jl'NCTION 'VIIEN IT ABUSES ITS
11

PO'V ER, AND IT IS FOR TI-IE COURT TO
THE UNREASONABLENESS
OF THE ACT BASED UPON THE FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE.
A municipal corporation may not abuse its statutory powers or act unreasonably, arbitrary or capriciously in carrying out its otherwise authorized functions. Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., supra. If it attempts to do so, such action may be properly enjoined.
It is acknowledged that courts may not merely substitute their own judgment for that of the municipality
on the grounds that the municipality acted unwisely
or that the court might have decided differently if the
initial judgment had been the court's. However, where
the action of a city is unreasonable, arbitrary or "predicated on a fundamentally wrong basis", the courts may
properly enjoin such action. Group Health Cooperative
v. King County Medical Soc., 39 'Vash. 2d 586, 237
P.2d 737 (1952). See also Heron v. City of Denver,
131 Colo. 501, 283 P.2d 647 (1955).
The basic criteria upon which the court is to judge
the city's action are those of arbitrariness and unrea- ,
sonableness-criteria which the court is to apply based
upon the facts of each individual case. This principle ,
has been ably discussed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Arcadia Development Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 125 N.,;\T, 2d 846 (1964). Certain businessmen in the City of Bloomington brought a mandatory
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injundion to rec1uire the City to issue a permit for the
erection of a business sign. The lower Court granted
the injuuetion and the Supreme Court affirmed it. In
discussing the criteria upon which a city's action is to
be judged, the Court said:
"In this state, a city had wide discretion dealing with matters of local importance * * * But
the state, through its courts, still retains the
power, duty, and concern to restrain a transgression of the bound and standards of the granting
of power * * *
"The bounds of municipal action are more
easily stated than applied* * * As a useful rule,
it has long been stated that a city must act 'reasonably', otherwise its ordinances must not have
the effect of overcoming the property rights of
others. Its acts must be calculated to effect its
legitimate purposes and goals without going beyond the demands of the occasion. (citing cases) .
.Further, ordinances and actions taken thereunder must be reasonable when applied to individual cases. (citing cases) * * *

"U nreasorwhleness is a leyal conclusion, made
upon rm c.i'amination of the circumstances. If
the unreasonableness of an action is plain, clear,
manifest and undoubted, it is a proper subject
for restraint by the court providing it violates
substantial rights of others * * *" (Emphasis
added).
It is clear that this same principle applies even
where the city is exercising a power which it lawfully
li:1s, if a speeific exercise of that power is arbitrary or
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unreasonable under the circumstances. This is made
clear by the Supreme Court of Florida in Blitch v. City
of Ocala, 142 Fla. 612, 195 So. 406 ( 1940) . The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the injunction against
a city preventing it from enforcing a certain zoning
ordinance against the plaintiff. In discussing the responsibility of municipalities the Court said at 195 So. 410:
"l\lunicipalities may be enjoined from unreasonably and arbitrarily exercising a lawful power
conferred upon them by the legislature for such
power cannot la "'·fully be so exercised as to unnecessarily violate the organic rights of individuals * * * In order to render a zoning ordinance invalid, it must affirmatively appear that
the restriction is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and without substantial relation to the public
safety, health, morals or general welfare (citing
cases) . The determination of such a question depends upon the facts of each particular case."
(Emphasis added) .
The import of the foregoing cases is apparent. If
a city acts unreasonably or arbitrarily so as to cause
irreparable injuries or damage or invade the rights of
others, that action may be enjoined, even though such
action was taken pursuant to or under the color of
authority of a legitimate power which the city possesses.

'Vhether Beaver City acted unreasonably or arbi- ,
trarily so as to cause irreparable injuries or damage to
the rights of others is a legal conclusion for the trial
Court to have determined based upon the particular
facts of this case.
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There were no facts before the Court on the defendants'
for Summary Judgment, upon which
the trial Court could base a determination whether or
not the acts of the City with respect to the proposed
annexation were unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious
or constituted an abuse of power, and this Court should
remand the matter for a factual determination of those
issues.

POINT IV.
,:\ l\IUNICIPALITY l\tIA Y NOT DELEGATE
ITS LEGISLATI\TE PO\YER TO ANNEX
PROPERTY.
The restriction or extension of municipal boundaries is a legislative matter. Plutus Minin,q Co. v. Orme,
snpra. \Vhile the Legislature may delegate to municipal
corporations its authority to restrict or enlarge city
corporate limits, and has, in fact, done so, Young v.
Salt Lah:e City, supra., municipalities may not re-delegate to priYate individuals or corporations the power
to decide such legislative matters. Cit,1} of Eureka v.
1Vilsun, 1.5 Utah 67, 48 Pac. 150 (1897). The delegation
to private citizens of· the direct power to determine
when and if ever the annexation shall actually occur
olffiously falls within the ambit proscribed by the above
eases ..Moreoyer, there is no authority for such a delegation under Section 10-3-1, and quite to the contrary,
that Section unmistakablv sets forth the mandate of
.

.
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the Legislature that either there is annexation or there
is not annexation, and this upon the determination and
decision of the City Council only. Section 10-3-1 provides in pertinent part:

" * * * if two-thirds of all the members of
* * * the City Council * * * vote for such annexa-

tion, an ordinance shall be passed, declaring the
annexation of such territory and the extension of
the limits of such city * * * "

Two concepts lucidly appear from a reading of the
foregoing: First, once the city council determines that
annexation should occur by two-thirds vote, the council,
by mandate, shall enact an ordinance declaring the
annexation; second, only the council may determine if,
when and how the annexation shall take place and it has
no authority to so condition the annexation as to delegate to private individuals its mandatory functions.
Contrary to the mandate of the statute, however,
the Beaver City Council voted for annexation and then
passed off its statutory duty to the indiYidual and corporate defendants to make the final determination and
decision as to annexation.
This is not a case where the council declared annexation and then conditioned the issuance of building
permits upon completion of certain prerequisites by the
residents of the annexed territory. Nor does it involve
the requirement of a commitment by the residents to
do certain things upon annexation. Rather, the Beaver
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City Council declared annexation to become a fait
11 ccompli only upon the finalization of determinations
tu /Je made hy individual citizens, and then only if such
determinations were so made. At that point, the legislative power of the City to control the fact of annexation
was out of its hands, and it could no longer, by its own
decision, determine when and if ever annexation would
occur.

This is the essence of the allegations of plaintiffs'
complaint regarding the matter of improper delegation,
and plaintiffs should be entitled to a trial on the merits
as to the contested issues of fact now appearing on the
face of the pleadings.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment was not the proper point in
the course of this lawsuit for the trial Court to have
decided matters of fact. Rather, summary judgment
was only appropriate to determine whether there were
genuine issues of fact.
In the present case, there were before the trial
Court, on the hearing for summary judgment, no substantial and material facts which were not in dispute.
Every material issue raised in plaintiffs' complaint was
in c..:ontroversy between the parties, and the plaintiffs,
ha ,·ing properly raised issues which were properly before the trial Court to determine, should have had an
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opportunity to present, at a trial on the merits, the
factual basis for the allegations in their complaint, which
if found to be true, would have entitled them to the
relief sought.
To that end, it is respectfully urged that the Summary Judgment against the plaintiffs herein be reversed
and vacated and that the case be remanded for a full
and complete presentation and resolution of the issues
which have been raised herein.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, .JR.
STE,VART M. HANSON, JR.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
400 El Paso Gas Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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